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The Regulation of Insider Trading in
the United States, United Kingdom,
and Japan
Barbara Ann Banoff*
Insider trading has long been the subject of intense debate (and, more recently,
intensive enforcement activity) in the United States.
Those arguing that insider trading should be prohibited state that it destroys
investor confidence in the stock market' and harms those who trade with, or on
the other side of the market from, the insider.2 Opponents of insider trading also
make two related, but somewhat mutually exclusive, arguments: first, that insider
trading delays the release of information both to the public and within the corpo-
ration, thus harming both market and corporate efficiency,3 and second, con-
versely, that it harms corporations by resulting in the premature release, through
leakage, of their confidential information. 4 The final argument, and the clear
winner in the political stakes at least, is that insider trading just isn't fair.5
Those who argue that insider trading should not be prohibited (and sometimes
even that it should actively be encouraged) state that it provides entrepreneurial
* Harold Edward Harter Professor of Commercial Law, University of Louisville. B.A. 1966,
Radcliffe College; J.D. 1973, University of Santa Clara. I thank Professor John Farrar of the Univer-
sity of Canterbury, David Reid, Esq. of Allen & Overy, and Pamela Atkins of Buraff Publications,
Inc., for their assistance in obtaining otherwise unavailable materials, and Susan Armstrong, J.D.
1988, University of Louisville Law School, for her research assistance.
1. D. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING HANDBOOK 12-13 (1987 ed.). See also Brudney, Insiders,
Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Law, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322,
353-56 (1979); Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic
Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1115 (1985).
2. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 E2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974). See also
Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who Is Harmed,
and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 1Ob-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217 (1981).
3. See, e.g., R.C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 8.2.3 (1986); Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading
Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051 (1982).
4. Scott, Insider Trading: Rule lOb-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 801,
814-15 (1980).
5. D. LANGEVOORT, supra note I, at 13-14.
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compensation and provides an incentive for management to take beneficial risks. 6
They also argue that it does not harm traders7 and does not decrease confidence in
the markets.' Indeed, they say, insider trading is an important mechanism of
market efficiency.9 Finally, since insider trading does not harm anyone and pro-
duces substantial benefits, it is not unfair.'0
While the debate will undoubtedly continue, the trend in the United States is
not only to continue the prohibition against insider trading, but also to expand its
coverage and increase the penalties for violation." The United States, however, is
not the only country with a developed securities market, nor is it the only country
in which insider trading is controversial.
The world's three major stock exchanges are located in New York, London,
and Tokyo. In the United Kingdom, a decade of controversy led to the relatively
recent enactment of a law making insider trading, at least in some circumstances,
a criminal offense. In Japan, insider trading is theoretically illegal, but the law is
not enforced and most observers believe that insider trading is quite common.
This article will discuss the laws regulating insider trading in the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Japan. A comparative analysis is useful for two
reasons.
First, securities markets are now transnational. American companies list their
securities on foreign exchanges and foreign issuers' securities are traded here. 2
Foreign investors may trade on the American stock or options markets (and
6. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); 0arlton & Fischel, The
Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983).
7. See, e.g., Carney, Signalling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 863
(1987).
8. Id. at 894-97.
9. Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Eficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984). Gilson
and Kraakman also argue that the efficiency of this mechanism would be improved if it were easier for
the market to decode the identity of the trader. Accordingly, they propose a requirement of advance
notification.
10. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of
Information, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 309, 323-39.
I1. Two versions of a proposed amendment to the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 are
currently before Congress. Both would codify the "misappropriation theory" discussed in the text
accompanying notes 45-46, infra. One bill was proposed by an ad hoc group of securities lawyers
(the "Pitt group"), 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 903 (June 19, 1987); the other has been recom-
mended by the SEC, id. at 1284 (Aug. 14, 1987), modified id. at 1817 (Nov. 27, 1987). Neither version
requires that insider trading be labelled "fraud"; both focus simply on "wrongful" use. In fact, the
principle drafter of the "Pitt group's" version recently stated that his bill rests on a "market unfair-
ness" concept. 20 Fed. Sec. Reg. & L. Rep (BNA) 487 (Apr. I, 1988).
There is, however, some doubt that either version will become law. Two SEC Commissioners
oppose new legislation, and an SEC official has predicted that the odds are strongly against enact-
ment, at least this year. Id. at 323 (Mar. 4, 1988).
12. For example, according to the SEC, there are 15 U.S. securities listed on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange and 8 Japanese securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange, with another 18 Japanese
securities quoted on NASDAQ. 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 769 (May 30, 1986.)
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sometimes may trade on inside information). 3 American investors may purchase
securities in foreign markets and may even use foreign intermediaries to trade on
American markets-a practice which occasionally has made the enforcement of
our insider trading laws difficult.
4
The effective enforcement of any prohibition of insider trading will therefore
depend, at least at times, on bi-lateral or multi-lateral cooperation. That coopera-
tion is more likely to be achieved if the other country or countries involved also
prohibit insider trading.'5
Second, to the extent the existence or scope of the prohibition differs from
country to country, some useful light may be shed on the controversy over insider
trading generally. Part of the difficulty for those who believe that insider trading
should not be prohibited is that they must argue from suppositions in the absence
of data; if (hypothetically) insider trading were not illegal, then a given result
would or would not follow. Since, however, insider trading in the United States is
illegal, the consequences of permitting it cannot be tested here. The availability
of developed securities markets in countries where insider trading is not illegal,
whether formally or merely functionally, provides a laboratory in which to test
the arguments. 16
Part I of this article will briefly discuss the American laws regulating insider
trading; 7 Part II will discuss the law of the United Kingdom; and Part III will
discuss the regulation-or, more accurately, the non-regulation-of insider trad-
ing in Japan.
13. See, e.g., SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 ER.D. Ill (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
14. For example, Dennis Levine used a Bahamian bank to make over $12.6 million in profits over a
five-year period. G. Lynch & R. Souza, SEC Enforcement Developments October 1895 through
September 1986 28 (Sept. 19, 1986) (unpublished manuscript), presented at Fourteenth Annual
Securities Regulation Institute (U.C.S.D 1987).
15. Foreign bank secrecy and blocking laws have been a particular problem. In 1982, the United
States and Swiss governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with respect to
problems of insider trading. The MOU was accompanied by a private agreement among members of
the Swiss Banker's Association who trade on U.S. securities markets. See generally id. at 69-70;
Note, Banking Secrecy and Insider Trading: The U.S.-Swiss Memorandum of Understanding on .
Insider Trading, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 605 (1983). The MOU and the private agreement were intended to
assist U.S. authorities in obtaining information, and to a certain extent they have done so. Nev-
ertheless, it is widely believed that cooperative efforts will be strengthened when insider trading
becomes illegal in Switzerland-which is expected to happen in mid-1988. I Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. No.
2 at 3 (Jan. 6, 1988).
16. I can do no more than suggest areas for empirical research. I hope that those engaged in such
research will refine my suggestions.
17. The discussion must of necessity be brief. My purpose here is to furnish an intelligible
summary for purposes of comparison. Readers will have to look elsewhere for a comprehensive
discussion. Insider trading now has its own subheading in the Index to Legal Periodicals, and is the
topic of an excellent one volume treatise by Professor Langevoort. I have not even attempted to cite all
of the available articles; a comprehensive bibiography would run for several pages. I can only assure
those who are not cited that they were at least read, and that their absence is not a comment on my
view of their importance.
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The article will conclude that there are enough similarities between the laws of
the United States and the United Kingdom to make the prospects for multina-
tional cooperation good. Indeed, such cooperation has already commenced."8
The Japanese situation is more ambiguous. The Japanese have signed an
agreement to cooperate with the American regulatory agencies, 19 and their laws
look somewhat like ours on paper. However, those laws are not enforced, and the
Japanese stock markets have been described as "an insider's paradise." 20
Whether the Japanese will be more committed to assisting the United States to
enforce its laws than they are to enforcing their own remains to be seen. That lack
of enforcement, however makes the Japanese markets2' a likely source of em-
pirical evidence in the continuing debate over insider trading.
I. UNITED STATES
The primary source for the regulation of insider trading in the United States is
federal law. The law is enforced by a federal regulatory agency, the Securities
Exchange Commission, by federal prosecutors, and by federal private civil rights
of action, both express and implied. State law has played a relatively minor
role.22
In the United States, it is unlawful for a corporate fiduciary to trade in the
securities of his or her own company on the basis of material, non-public infor-
mation.2 3 Fiduciaries who may not trade may not "tip" for personal pecuniary
benefit.24
Non-fiduciaries are also prohibited from trading or tipping under certain cir-
cumstances. First, "tippees" who know that their "tipper" breached a fiduciary
duty in giving them the information may not trade on it or tip others. 25 Second,
those who are given confidential information because of their professional or
business relationship with the company-so-called "temporary insiders"-may
not trade on or tip that information. 26 Third, those who misappropriate informa-
tion in violation of a duty to an employer (who is not the issuer of the securities
18. See infra text accompanying notes 197-98.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 199-200.
20. Repeta, Declining Public Ownership of Japanese Industry: A Case of Regulatory Failure?, 17
LAw IN JAPAN 184, cited in Murofushi, The Regulation of Insider Trading in Japan 21 n. 28 (Dec. 15,
1987) (unpublished manuscript).
21. Of course, Japan is not the only country with no real restraints against insider trading. In fact,
most of the members of the EEC do not yet prohibit it. See generally Note, Insider Trading and the
EEC: Harmonization of the Insider Trading Laws of the Member States, 8 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 151 (1985).
22. D, LANGEVOORT, supra note 1, at 22.
23. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). It should be noted that American law applies
to closely held, as well as publicly traded, securities.
24. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 655, n. 14.
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traded) commit a crime if they trade or tip. 7 Finally, no one in possession of
material, non-public information relating to a tender offer, who acquired that
information from the bidder or target, may use it to trade, and insiders of the
bidder and target may not disclose information to anyone likely to trade, whether
or not they violate a fiduciary duty by doing so.
2 8
As in other areas of securities regulation, the law of insider trading is in a
process of evolution. However, subject to correction in the next Supreme Court
term or Congressional session, the following sections summarize the applicable
statutes and rules.
A. Rule JOb-5
Rule lOb-5 29 is a "catch-all" antifraud rule which the SEC promulgated in 1943
pursuant to its authority, under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,30 to prohibit "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance."
While most cases brought under Rule lOb-5 involve misrepresentation, 31 the
rule has also been stretched to cover conduct, such as insider trading, in which
the complaint is not that someone lied, but that he or she did not say anything at
all.
While Congress could have made insider trading unlawful without worrying
about whether it was fraudulent, it has not yet done so. 32 Thus, the Commission
and the courts could only reach insider trading by framing the prohibition in
terms of disclosure. 33 They did so by announcing that insiders must either dis-
close or abstain from trading. If they trade without disclosing, they have commit-
ted fraud within the meaning of the rule. 34 Nevertheless, while formally
denominated "fraud", the gravamen of an inside trading case is unjust enrich-
ment, and the policy served is not disclosure but fairness.
35
1. Fiduciaries
The early lower court cases applying Rule lOb-5 to insider trading rested, at
least in part, on a theory of market egalitarianism; all traders in the market should
have, or at least have access to, relatively equal information.
36
27. Carpenter v. United States, No. 86-422, slip op. (U.S. Nov. 16, 1987).
28. See Rule 14e-3, 17 C.ER. § 240.14e-3 (1987).
29. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1981).
31. Banoff & DuVal, The Class Action as a Mechanism for Enforcing the Federal Securities Laws:
An Empirical Study of the Burdens Imposed, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 47 (1984).
32. Congress is now considering doing so. See supra note 11.
33. § 10(b) prohibits "deceptive or manipulative" words or conduct, but does not reach conduct
that is merely unfair. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
34. This view was accepted, as to fiduciaries, in Chiarella. See infra text accompanying notes
37-39.
35. D. LANGEVOORT, supra note 1, at 44, 46, 51; Banoff & DuVal, supra note 31, at 9 n. 28.
36. See, e.g. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 401 F2d
833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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In 1980, an insider trading case finally went to the Supreme Court. In
Chiarella v. United States,37 the Court rejected market egalitarianism as a basis
for the prohibition, holding that those who possess material, non-public informa-
tion are not forbidden to trade on it merely because others in the market do not
have the information and cannot obtain it.
3 8
Instead, the Court focused on the language of § 10(b), which limits the scope
of Rule lOb-5 to "manipulative or deceptive" words and conduct. 39 At common
law, silence is "deceptive" only where there is a duty to speak. According to the
Court, only fiduciaries have such a duty.4 The Court therefore held that trading
on non-public information, whether "market" or corporate, violates Rule l0b-5
only when the trader has violated a fiduciary duty.
Thus, after Chiarella, fiduciaries may not trade on information about their
company or the market for its securities. However, the Court reserved two ques-
tions about the extent to which those who are not fiduciaries of the issuer may
nevertheless violate the rule if they are "tipped" by a fiduciary, or if they
misappropriate the information in violation of a duty owed to someone other than
the issuer.
2. Tippees
Three years after Chiarella, the Supreme Court decided a case on tippee
liability. In Dirks v. SEC, 41 the Court held that "tippees" violate Rule 10(b)-5
only if the "tipper" breached his or her fiduciary duty in conveying the informa-
tion. 42 A breach of duty occurs only if the tipper received a personal pecuniary
benefit from the tip, although that benefit may take the form of reputational
advantage or a gift to a friend or relative.43 Further, the tippee must know that the
information is material and non-public, and must also know"4 that the tipping
insider is receiving a personal benefit. 45 The tippee's pecuniary benefit is irrele-
vant; if the tipper did not breach a duty, the tippee may trade.
37. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
38. Id. at 232-33.
39. Id. at 226-27.
40. Id. at 234-35. Prof. Langevoort argues that the Court's view of the common law was inaccu-
rate. D. LANGEVOORT, supra note 1, at 63-64.
41. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
42. Id. at 660.
43. Id. at 666-68.
44. Tippee liability thus rests on a "double scienter" requirement. It is not enough that the tippee
merely knows the information is material and non-public. SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D.
Okla. 1984).
45. If the tippee actually trades, both the tipper and the tippee violate the rule. If the tippee does
not trade (or tip in turn) the tipper may nevertheless be subject to the sanctions. Faberge Inc., 45
S.E.C. 249 (1973). However, this issue has not been conclusively decided by the courts.
INSIDER TRADING IN THE U.S., U.K., AND JAPAN 151
3. Temporary Insiders
In a footnote in Dirks, the Supreme Court stated that outsiders who occupy a
special confidential relationship with the issuer, such as underwriters, accoun-
tants, and attorneys, may become fiduciaries of the shareholders. 46 However, the
issuer must expect that information given to "temporary insiders" will not be
disclosed or, presumably, used for personal benefit. Further, the nature of the
relationship must make that expectation reasonable.
47
4. Misappropriaters
The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether someone who is not a fiduci-
ary of the company whose shares are being traded, but who misappropriates
confidential information and uses it to trade, violates Rule lOb-5. In Carpenter v.
United States,48 an evenly divided Court affirmed without discussion the peti-
tioners' convictions under Rule lOb-5 for engaging in a conspiracy to misap-
propriate information about the publication schedule of the Wall Street Journal
(for which one of them worked) so that they could purchase stock they knew a
Journal column would recommend.
The Second Circuit, whose ruling was affirmed, had held that the deceitful
conversion of an employer's confidential information was a fraud on the em-
ployer. Since that information was used for trading, the court held that the fraud
was "in connection with" the purchase or sale of a security and therefore violated
Rule lOb-5. 49 Unless or until another case goes to the Supreme Court, that
holding will stand.
The Carpenter Court did hold, unanimously, that the defendants' conduct
violated the federal mail and wire fraud statutes.50 Prosecutors presumably do not
care which law sends an inside trader to jail.5 The only effect, therefore, of a
subsequent decision that misappropriation does not violate Rule lOb-5 would be
that the SEC could not bring enforcement actions, and misappropriaters would
not be subject to the Insider Trading Sanctions Act, at least in its current form.
B. Rule 14e-3
Section 14(e) of the Williams Act 52 outlaws fraudulent, deceptive, or manip-
ulative acts or practices in connection with a tender offer. In 1980, shortly after
Chiarella, the SEC promulgated Rule 14e-3. 5 3 The rule prohibits anyone with
46. 463 U.S. at 655 n. 14.
47. Id.
48. Carpenter v. United States, supra note 27.
49. 791 E2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986).
50. Carpenter v. United States, supra note 27, at 5-9.
51. See Blodgett, Insider Trading Cures?, 74 A.B.A. J. 42, 43 (Mar. 1, 1988).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1981).
53. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1985).
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advance knowledge of a tender offer, or of material events during a tender offer,
from trading on that information if 1) the offeror has taken a substantial step
toward commencement of the bid, 2) the information was acquired from the
bidder or the target (and the trader knows or has reason to know this) and 3) the
information is non-public.
5 4
The rule also makes it unlawful for the bidder, the target, their insiders, or any
of their tippees to give non-public information about a tender offer to anyone who
is likely to trade.55
Rule 14e-3 goes well beyond Rule lOb-5, at least as interpreted by Chiarella
and Dirks. It is not necessary that either the trader or the tipper have a fiduciary
duty to the target company's shareholders, nor that the information be misap-
propriated. For example, bidders may not encourage friendly institutions or
arbitrageurs to buy target shares so that they will be tendered, a practice known
as "warehousing" .56
To the extent that conduct which would not be illegal under Rule lOb-5 may be




The Securities Exchange Commission may not prosecute criminal cases itself,
but it may refer them to the Department of Justice. An increasing number of
criminal cases have been brought, with violators frequently sentenced to prison58
and fined. Some defendants have also been ordered to pay restitution.
59
2. Securities Exchange Commission
The Commission may bring civil actions in federal court for injunctive relief,





56. Id. The bidder may itself purchase shares on the market, however.
57. See D. LANGEVOOr, supra note I, at 232-40.
58. G. Lynch & M. Missal, Recent Civil and Criminal Prosecutions of Insider Trading Violations
33-34 (Jan. 1987) (unpublished manuscript), presented at Fourteenth Annual Securities Regulation
Institute (U.C.S.D. 1987). Probation and mandatory community service appear to have been imposed
more frequently, however.
59. Id.
60. § 21(d)(1) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1981) gives the SEC power to seek an injunction,
and disgorgement is an ancillary remedy. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u(d)(2) (1981), provides a civil penalty of up to three times the defendant's profits in addition to
any other relief the Commission may obtain.
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The Commission may also institute disciplinary proceedings against attorneys,
accountants, or market professionals .
61
The Commission has announced that insider trading is a high enforcement
priority; from 1980 to the end of 1986, the SEC brought 143 insider trading
actions. 62 In 1986 alone, defendants disgorged more than $30 million, and that
does not include the $100 million Ivan Boesky was ordered to pay.
63
3. Private Civil Actions
The Second Circuit has recognized an implied cause of action under Rule
lOb-5 for insider trading on behalf of all those who traded on the other side of the
market from the insider.64 Damages, however, are limited to the amount of the
defendant's profits. 65 Perhaps because of this limitation, 66 private actions against
inside traders are infrequent.
Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act also grants an express right of action to a
corporation (or a shareholder suing derivatively) to recover "short-swing" profits
made by officers, directors, or more than 10% shareholders within a six-month
period .67
II. UNITED KINGDOM
Until 1980, insider trading was not against the law in the U.K. There was (and
is) no common law prohibition; while company directors have stringent fiduciary
duties to the corporation, they owe no duties to shareholders. 6 Accordingly,
there was no common law duty to "disclose or abstain. '
69
To say that insider trading was not illegal is not to say that it was approved.
Both the Stock Exchange and the Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers had rules
against insider trading, and several disciplinary proceedings were brought by
61. § 15(b)(4)ofthe 1934Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(1981), gives the Commission the power to discipline
market professionals. The Commission has also used Rule 2(e) of its Rules of Practice to bring
administrative proceedings against accountants and attorneys. See Marsh, Rule 2(e) Proceedings, 35
Bus. LAW 987 (1980).
62. See G. Lynch & M. Missal, supra note 58, at 1.
63. G. Lynch, Remarks at Fourteenth Annual Securities Regulation Institute (U.C.S.D. 1987).
64. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); see
also Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications, 648 F2d 88 (2d Cir. 1981).
65. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F2d 156, 168-73 (2d Cir. 1980).
66. Even before Elkind, private actions for insider trading were rare. Banoff & DuVal, supra note
31. at 47.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1981).
68. Percival v. Wright, [1902] 2 Ch. 421.
69. Id. It is even unclear whether the corporation could recover from the insider, although
commentators believe that it probably could. See, e.g. J. H. FARRAR, COMPANY LAW 356 (1985); B.
RIDER, D. CIIAIKIN, & C. ABRAMS, GuIDE TO THE FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT 1986 702 at 98
(CCH Ed. Ltd. U.K. 1987) Ihereinafter cited as GUIDEI.
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those bodies. 70 In addition, the Companies Act required directors to disclose their
interests in their companies' shares7I and prohibited them from dealing in options
on their companies' listed securities.
7
1
These statutory provisions and the efforts of the self-regulatory authorities
were seen by some as inadequate. 73 After two unsuccessful attempts to amend the
statute,7 4 the Companies Act was amended in 1980 to make insider trading a
criminal offense. In 1985, those sections were re-enacted, with some amend-
ments, as the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act. 75 The Insider Dealing
Act was in turn amended by the Financial Services Act of 1986, which made
substantial changes in the British regulatory system 76 (and which accompanied
the "Big Bang's" transformation of the securities market in London).
7
The Insider Dealing Act is now the primary-and perhaps the only-source of
U.K. law in this area. 7 The self regulatory authorities will probably continue to
supervise their members and to assist in the detection of insider trading, but their
previous substantive regulatory and enforcement roles have been transferred to
the Department of Trade and Industry.
79
Briefly, the Insider Dealing Act (the "Act") makes it a criminal offense for
insiders who possess unpublished, price-sensitive information to trade, tip, or
counsel others to trade in the securities of the insider's company or, in some
cases, other companies. The Act applies only to trades on a stock exchange or in
the over-the-counter market; closely held corporations and privately negotiated
transactions are not covered.
Public servants and their tippees are also forbidden to trade while in possession
of inside information acquired by virtue of their position. Finally, those con-
templating a tender offer, and their tippees, may not trade on their own behalf.
70. See Rider, Self-Regulation: The British Approach to Policing Conduct in the Securities Busi-
ness, With Particular Reference to the Role of the City Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers in the
Regulation of Inside Trading, I J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 319 (1978).
71. Companies Act, 1985, ch. 6, §§ 324-29, reenacting Companies Act, 1967, ch. 81, §§ 27-29.
72. Companies Act, 1985, ch. 6, § 324, reenacting Companies Act, 1967, ch. 81, § 27.
73. See J. FARRAR, supra note 67, at 346, citing The Report of the Company Law Committee (The
Jenkins Committee) Cmnd 1749, 89.
74. Companies Bill 1973 and 1978. These bills were not enacted.
75. Company Securities (insider Dealing) Act, 1985, ch. 8 [hereinafter cited as Insider Dealing
Act]. For a general discussion of the 1980 version, see Branson, Insider Trading: The British
Regulation in the Light of the American Experience, 1982 J. Bus. L. 342 -48, 413-20, 536-42.
76. In addition to the GUIDE, supra note 69, which is the only treatise on the Financial Services
Act so far, see Note, International Trade: Regulation of London's Financial Markets - The Financial
Services Act, 1986, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 196 (1987).
77. GUIDE, supra note 69, 211-13, contains a good description of the "Big Bang", which
occurred when the Stock Exchange abolished minimum commissions, permitted firms to act both as
brokers and dealers, and switched to computerized trading.
78. The statute does not preempt the common law, but as noted earlier, there have been no common
law cases.
79. GUIDE, supra note 69, 702, at 98.
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The following sections summarize the provisions of the Insider Dealing Act.
The subheadings used are not necessarily found in the Act (for example, the Act
does not use the word "tippees") but have been chosen for purposes of com-
parison with United States law.
A. Insiders
All insiders are fiduciaries, but not all fiduciaries are insiders. An insider, for
purposes of the Act, must be "knowingly connected" with the issuer of the
securities traded, or have been connected with the issuer within the previous six
months.8 0 Only individuals are covered by the Act; corporations are not directly
prohibited from trading on inside information, although they may be regarded as
aiders and abettors.
8 1
Directors are automatically "connected" with the issuer.82 Officers and other
employees are "connected" only where they 1) occupy a position which would
reasonably be expected to give access to inside information and 2) would reason-
ably be expected not to disclose such information except in the performance of
their duties.83 An employee of the issuer who is not in such a position, but who
nevertheless happens across inside information, does not violate the Act by
trading on it.84
B. Temporary Insiders
Individuals are also "connected" with the issuer if they occupy a position
involving a professional or business relationship with the issuer, or are employed
by, or a director of, companies which have such a relationship. Again, however,
the position must be one which may reasonably be expected to give access to
confidential information, and it must be reasonable to expect someone in that
position not to disclose such information except in the proper performance of his
or her duties.85
C. Tippees
Tippees (or, in U.K. parlance, "secondary insiders") are also covered by the
Act. A tippee is anyone who knowingly obtains inside information from a "con-
80. Insider Dealing Act supra note 75, at § 9; J. FARRAR, supra note 69, at 348.
81. GUIDE, supra note 69, 705, at 100.
82. GUIDE, supra note 69, $ 706, at 100. Directors of related companies (subsidiaries, holding
companies, or another subsidiary of a holding company) are also "connected". Those connected with
foreign companies are included in the Act. Insider Dealing Act, supra note 75, at § 9(a).
83. Insider Dealing Act, supra note 75, at § 9(b).
84. GUIDE, supra note 69, 706, at 100.
85. Insider Dealing Act, supra note 75, at § 9. This category is quite similar to the "temporary
insiders" who may violate Rule lOb-5. See supra text accompanying notes 30-51.
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nected" person if the tippee 1) knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the
tipper received the information by virtue of the tipper's position, 2) knows or has
reasonable cause to believe that a person in the tipper's position would reasonably
be expected not disclose it, and 3) knows or has reasonable cause to believe that
the information is unpublished and price-sensitive. 6
The tippee must have received specific information. If the tipper has simply
advised the tippee to trade, the tippee may do so without violating the Act, even
if the advice is accompanied by nudges and winks and the tippee has reason to
believe that it is based on inside information.87
D. Inside Information
The Act defines inside information as unpublished, price-sensitive information
in relation to the securities in which the insider, or the tippee, deals. 88
Information is "unpublished" if it is "not generally known to those persons
who are accustomed or would be likely to deal in those securities." 89 Apparently,
it is not necessary that the information be disclosed to the general public; whether
disclosure to market professionals suffices has not yet been decided. 90
Information is "price-sensitive" if it would, if published, "be likely materially
to affect the price of those securities." 9' It is not enough that the information
would be taken into account in the trading decisions of others. It must also be
likely to change the price.
The fact that the information is price-sensitive is a necessary, but not a suffici-
ent, condition. The information must also relate to "specific matters relating or of
concern (directly or indirectly) to that company, that is to say, ... not of a
general nature relating or of concern to that company." 92
The meaning of this language is obscure. The Act apparently distinguishes
between corporate information, at least some of which is covered, and market
86. Insider Dealing Act, supra note 75, at § 1(3)-(4). J. FARRAR, supra note 69, at 351-52. The
definition of "secondary insider" is again quite similar to the Dirks definition of a "tippee", since it
includes the requirement that the tipper breach a fiduciary duty by tipping. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 41-45.
87. J. FARRAR, supra note 69, at 342. The requirements of specific information should be
contrasted with the position of at least one American court which held that merely recommending the
stock as a "good buy" was an illegal tip. See Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., supra note 36.
88. Insider Dealing Act, supra note 75, at § 10(a). See generally Herne, Inside Information:
Definitions in Australia, Canada, the U.K, and the U.S., 8 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEc. REG. 1 (1986).
89. Insider Dealing Act, supra note 75, at § 10(b). -
90. J. FARRAR, supra note 69, at 350. It should be noted that, in an efficient market, information
disclosed to securities professionals will be reflected in the price, even if uninformed traders do not
have access to it.
91. Insider Dealing Act, supra note 75, at § 10.
92. Insider Dealing Act, supra note 75, at § 10(a).
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information, which is not.93 However, some kinds of corporate information may
not be covered by the definition. The problem lies with the meaning of "spe-
cific". One commentator suggests that "specific" matters would include divi-
dend payments, changes in capital structure, mergers, acquisitions, or
divestitures, and business changes.' At the Committee stage, the Minister of
Trade stated that "the kind of thing we are after is knowledge of dramatic events,
major happenings, and things which will -transform the company's prospects. "9
Thus, in theory, information which is price-sensitive but not "dramatic" or
"transforming" may be used to trade. 96 In practice, the courts are likely to look at
the actual impact of the information when it is disclosed. If prices changed more




An insider commits a criminal offense if he or she buys or sells securities
(including debentures or options) 9 on a recognized stock exchange or through an
off-market dealer99 while in possession of unpublished, price-sensitive
information.
While the basic offense lies in trading the securities of the insider's own
company, the prohibition extends to the securities of any other company if the
inside information relates to an actual or contemplated transaction between the
insider's company and that other company, or involving one of them and the
securities of the other, or to the fact that a contemplated transaction has been
abandoned. 100
The information must relate to the transaction; information incidentally ac-
quired during negotiations is not covered.' 0' The information must be specific;
93. GUIDE, supra note 69, 711, at 104-07; J. FARRAR, supra note 69, at 349. In contrast, market
information is considered "inside" information in the United States. See text accompanying notes.
39-47,
94. J. FARRAR, supra note 69, at 349. See also, GUIDE, supra note 69, 711, at 104.
95. J. FARRAR, supra note 69, at 349 n.3.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 350. In contrast, in the United States courts have tended to focus on whether the
information was material to the defendant.
98. Insider Dealing Act, supra note 75, at § 12(a); GUIDE, supra note 69, 709, at 102.
99. GUIDE, supra note 69, 708, at 101-02. The DTI views the unlisted securities market as a
stock market for purposes of the Act. In contrast to the U.S., however, trading in the securities of
private companies is not covered; nor are private transactions in listed companies. J. FARRAR supra
note 69, at 351.
100. Insider Dealing Act, supra note 75, at § 1(2).
101. J. FARRAR, supra note 69, at 351.
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preliminary negotiations may not rise to that level.0 2 Finally, it is not clear
whether the term "transaction" requires a bilateral relationship, as opposed to the
unilateral intention of the insider's company to acquire or dispose of shares in the
other. 103
The offense requires scienter. The insider must have been knowingly con-
nected with the company, must know that the information was obtained by virtue
of that position, and must know that it is unpublished and price-sensitive. 104 The
offense does not, however, require that the insider use the information in deciding
to deal; it is enough that the insider possessed the information by virtue of the
connection, and that he or she would be in breach of a duty to the company if the
information were disclosed. 05
Tippees (including remote tippees, if they meet the scienter requirements)
0 6
are subject to the same trading prohibitions as insiders.
2. Tipping
If insiders or their tippees would be prohibited from trading, then they are also
prohibited from communicating their information to any person they know, or
have reasonable cause to believe, will use the information to trade, or recommend
trading, the security. "01 For purposes of establishing the tipper's liability, the
tippee may be a company, although companies cannot themselves violate the
Act. 108
The tipper's offense is complete when the information is passed to one likely to
make use of it, even if the tippee does not in fact trade or tip in turn. Thus, it is a
crime for a non-trading insider to tip a non-trading tippee. 09
3. Counselling and Procuring
Those prohibited from trading may not recommend that someone else do so, if
they know or have reasonable cause to believe that their advice would be fol-
lowed." 0 "Counselling and procuring" differ from "tipping" in that the specific
information is not itself passed along."' "Tippees" who trade commit a crime
themselves; "counsellees" who trade do not violate the Act, although the coun-
sellor does."2
102. Herne, supra note 88, at 6.
103. GUIDE, supra note 69, $ 713, at 105.
104. J. FARRAR, supra note 69, at 348-50.
105. GUIDE, supra note 69, 710, at 103.
106. Id. 715, at 107.
107. Insider Dealing Act, supra note 75, at § 1(7)-(8).
108. See id. § 1(8). See also J. FARRAR, supra note 67, at 348 n. 13.
109. GUIDE, supra note 69, 11 719, at 109. In this area, the United Kingdom is more rigorous than
the United States.
110. Insider Dealing Act, supra note 75, at § 1(7).
III. GUIDE, supra note 69, $ 718, at 108.
112. J. FARRAR, supra note 69, at 352.
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4. Tender Offers
The Act also applies to anyone who is contemplating (or has contemplated)
making a take-over offer for another company. If that person knows that the fact
that such an offer is contemplated (or is no longer contemplated) is unpublished
price-sensitive information with respect to the target company's securities, then
he or she may not trade, tip, or counsel or procure trading in the securities of the
target except for the purpose of making or facilitating the offer."3 That "except"
is important; "warehousing" does not violate the Act."
4
As with insiders, this section applies only to individuals. If a corporation is
actually the potential offeror, then an insider of that corporation is not, at least in
theory, covered by the section, although a court might be willing to interpret it
differently."5 If a court were not so willing, then a corporate acquiror's insiders
would violate the act by trading in target securities only if a contemplated offer is
a "transaction" within the meaning of section 1(2) of the Act."
6
5. Public Servants
Public servants and their tippees are prohibited from trading, tipping, or coun-
selling or procuring, if they are in possession of inside information obtained by
virtue of their office which it would be reasonable to expect them not to disclose
except in the proper performance of their duties." 7
F. Defenses and Exemptions
There are five defenses to a charge of insider trading where the facts would
otherwise support a conviction.
1. Purpose Other Than To Make a Profit or Avoid a Loss
An insider who trades while in possession of unpublished, price-sensitive
information, but who does so "otherwise than with a view to making a profit or
the avoidance of a loss,"" 8 does not violate the Act. This provision is intended to
protect the insider who is forced by circumstances to trade.
The defense has been criticized on the grounds that it permits insiders to "drive
a coach and horses through the legislation" ' ' 9 because insiders will frequently be
able to construct some pressing financial reason for the trade, and will in any
113. Insider Dealing Act, supra note 75 at § 1(5); GUIDE, supra note 69, at 716, at 107.
114. "Warehousing" is, however, illegal in the United States, assuming Rule 14e-3 is valid. See
supra text accompanying note 28.
115. J. FARRAR, supra note 69, at 352 n. 3.
116. See supra text accompanying note 103.
117. Insider Dealing Act, supra note 75, at § 2. Public servants include members and agents of
self-regulatory organizations.
118. Id. at § 3(l)(a).
119. J. FARRAR, supra note 69, at 354 citing Sugarman and Ashe (1981) 2 Co. L. 13, 17.
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event time the trade to get the best possible result. 120 Other commentators suggest
that there will always be an element of profit-making or loss-avoiding in any
insider trade; the defense will thus be of little use unless a court decides that
profit-making must be the primary (as opposed to a subsidiary) motive for the
transaction. 12
2. Liquidators, Receivers, and Trustees-In-Bankruptcy
A liquidator, receiver, or trustee-in-bankruptcy may trade (or presumably, tip
or counsel) while in possession of inside information if he or she does so in the
good faith exercise of his or her functions. 122 Since the function of such a position
is to protect creditors, the effect of this defense is to prefer creditors to equity
holders, or (if the transaction is in debentures) to prefer some creditors to others.
3. Dealers and Market Makers
Dealers (called "jobbers" in the U.K.)'23 and market makers 124 are exempted
from the prohibitions of the Act if 1) the information was obtained in the course
of business, 2) was of the sort that it would be reasonable to expect a dealer or
market maker to obtain, and 3) his or her conduct was in the good faith perform-
ance of the business. This defense is particularly interesting because the sort of
inside information that dealers and market makers would ordinarily be expected
to have is market information, which is excluded from the definition of inside
information in any event. 2 5 Accordingly, the defense will only be used when the
market professional traded, tipped, or recommended trading while in possession
of specific, price-sensitive information about the company.
4. Facilitating The Completion or The Carrying Out of a Transaction
If an individual has already started a transaction, and then comes into posses-
sion of inside information that would have prohibited trading, the transaction may
nevertheless be completed.'26 This defense also permits a person contemplating a
tender offer to trade, tip, or counsel, if the purpose is to facilitate the offer,'27 and
allows those connected with a company engaged in (or contemplating) a transac-
120. Id. This criticism seems far-fetched; the lightning of inside information doesn't strike that
often.
121. GUIDE, supra note 69, 720, at 109.
122. Insider Dealing Act, supra note 75, at § 3(l)(b).
123. § 3(l)(c) defines a "jobber" as an individual, partnership or company dealing in securities on
a recognized stock exchange and recognized by the council of the Stock Exchange as carrying on the
business of a jobber.
124. The Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, § 174(2) defines a market maker as an individual,
partnership or company, who is at all times ready to buy or sell securities at a specified price, in
compliance with the rules of (and recognized by) a stock exchange.
125. See supra note 93.
126. See supra text accompanying note 93. Insider Dealing Act, supra note 75, at § 3(2).
127. See Insider Dealing Act, supra note 75, at § 3(2)(a).
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tion with another company to trade, tip, or counsel with respect to the securities
of the second company if the purpose is to facilitate the transaction. 28
5.Fiduciaries
Trustees and personal representatives, which include investment bankers, com-
mercial bankers, and fund managers, may trade on behalf of their beneficiaries
while in possession of unpublished, price-sensitive information if they act on the
advice of a person who appears to the fiduciary to be both appropriate and not
prohibited from dealing-for example, a stockbroker who does not possess the
information. 29
It seems somewhat strange that the knowledgeable can absolve themselves by
seeking advice from the ignorant, particularly when the circumstances may make
quite clear the purpose for which the advice is sought. 3 0 However, there were two
purposes for this provision: to permit fiduciaries to protect beneficiaries, and to
protect fiduciaries against claims by beneficiaries.' 3'
G. Enforcement
1. Investigations
The Financial Services Act substantially increased the enforcement powers of
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in investigating suspected insider
trading. The DTI may now appoint one or more inspectors 32 who may require
the production of documents and take testimony under oath. 13  An unreasonable
refusal to cooperate is subject to contempt proceedings in the High Court. 134 If
128. Id. This clearly demonstrates that the U.K.'s prohibition of inside trading is based on a breach
of fiduciary duty, not market egalitarianism.
129. Id. at § 7. If the fiduciary acts on such advice, then it is presumed that defense #1 (purpose
other than seeking profit or avoiding loss) is met. J. FARRAR, supra note 69, at 355.
130. If the fiduciary customarily uses "in house" investment advice, but goes to an outsider to take
advantage of the § 7 defense, the outsider may be able to decode the reason the advice is requested.
131. GuIDE, supra note 69, 723, at 111.
132. Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, § 177(1).
133. Id. Statements made by a person complying with an inspector's request may be used in
evidence against him or her. However, § 177(7) provides that an inspector may not demand informa-
tion subject to legal professional privilege. Further, § 177(8) provides that banks need not disclose
information related to customers unless 1) the inspectors have a reasonable belief that the customer
"may be able to give information concerning a suspected contravention", and 2) the Secretary of
State believes that disclosure of information is necessary.
134. Id. at § 178(2)(a). In one interesting case, a British journalist was fined £ 20,000 for failing to
comply with a DTI demand that he reveal his sources. The journalist had written newspaper articles
which accurately forecast the outcome of government decisions on whether to permit certain mergers.
The DTI was investigating whether leaks from the relevant government offices had resulted in insider
trading. The journalist was not himself charged with such trading, but the DTI thought his sources
might also be tipping others. The journalist continues to refuse to reveal his sources, and his
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the recalcitrant subject is in the investment business, the Secretary of State may
also cancel or restrict that person's authorization to carry on business.'35
The subject of a request for documents or testimony may not avoid it merely
because he or she did not know the identity of the principal for whose accounts
trades were made.136 Further, a foreign "blocking" statute'37 apparently may not
be used as an excuse unless an attempt was actually made to secure authority
from the client, pursuant to the foreign law, for the disclosure of the information




There are no civil penalties for violating the Act, although the Securities
Industry Board (SIB) has suggested that it may use its new powers under the
Financial Services Act to bring an injunctive proceeding or a restitution order
requiring the insider to disgorge profits."'
Parliament considered, but decided against, including an express civil right of
action for damages for insider trading, although it did include a general provision
permitting a private right of action to anyone who suffered a loss by reason of a
violation. 140
b. Criminal
Anyone indicted and convicted of an offense under the Act may be sentenced
to a maximum of two years or fined in an unspecified amount. 141 If the summary
conviction procedure is used, the maximum penalty is six months imprisonment
and/or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (currently £ 2000.)14 1 While
criminal courts in England are empowered to make compensation orders, it is
unlikely that they will do so in cases of insider trading.
43
As of early 1987, there had been seven prosecutions and five convictions under
newspaper has paid his fine. I INT'L SEC. REG. REP. 7-8 (Dec. 23, 1987); Id. at 8-9 (Feb. 3, 1988).
See also Tridimas, The Financial Services Act and the Detection of Insider Trading, 8 Co. L. 162
(1987).
135. Id. at § 178(3).
136. Id. at § 178(6)(a).
137. Id. at § 178(6)(b).
138. GUIDE, supra note 69, 732, at 119.
139. Id. 734, at 121.
140. Id.
141. Insider Dealing Act, supra note 75, at § 8.
142. Id.
143. GuIDE, supra note 69, 733, at 120. Compensation orders tend to be confined to direct,
personal transactions, and the Insider Dealing Act only applies to stock-exchange transactions. The
government has introduced a bill that would increase the maximum penalty to seven years imprison-
ment and make insider trading extraditable. I Int'l Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 4 (Mar. 2, 1988).
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the Act and its predecessor. 1 More cases were pending. So far, at least, the
sentences imposed have not been very heavy; no one has gone to prison.
45
However, the offenders have all either resigned their posts or have been removed
by their employers. 146 In the "Gentlemen's Club" of the City, being asked to
resign one's membership may be a fate worse than jail.
III. JAPAN
An American lawyer would find the Japanese securities statute quite familiar.
Japan's Securities Exchange Law of 1948 ("S.E.L.")1 47 was copied directly from
the United States' Securities Act of 1933148 and Securities Exchange Act of
1934.'49 This wholesale adoption of American law did not occur because the
Japanese thought American law was better than their own; the post-war Occupa-
tion authorities insisted on it as a condition to reopening the Japanese stock
exchanges. 15 0
It might be expected that law imposed by force would be abandoned when the
force departed. Interestingly, however, this did not occur. As soon as the Occupa-
tion forces left, Japan did start to amend the statute. For example, in 1952, the
Securities and Exchange Commission was abolished and replaced with a Se-
curities Bureau in the Ministry of Finance.' 5'
Nevertheless, although the S.E.L. has been amended more than 20 times since
its enactment, it continues to follow the American statutes. Indeed, several of the
amendments have tracked post-1948 developments in American securities law,1
52
144. Id.
145. J. FARRAR, supra note 69, at 357.
146. Id.
147. Shoken Torihiki Ho (Securities Exchange Law), Law No. 25 of 1948 (amended 1971). [here-
inafter cited as S.E.L.].
148. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a -77aa (1981).
149. 15 U.S.C §§ 78a-78KK (1981).
150. Yazawa, A Synopsis of Securities Regulation in Japan, in JAPANESE SECURMES REGULATION,
ch. I-B, 29 (L. Loss, M. Yazawa & B. Banoff ed. 1983); Ishizumi, Insider Trading Regulation: An
Examination of Section 16(b) and a Proposal for Japan, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 449, 451 (1979).
151. Yazawa, supra note 150, at 25; see generally Tatsuta, Enforcement of Japanese Securities
Legislation, I J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEc. REG. 95, 96-97 (1978); Ishizumi, supra note 150, at
488-89. Initially, there was only a section of a bureau of the Ministry of Finance, but it was then
upgraded to the Securities Bureau.
The switch from independent regulatory commission to executive branch bureau enabled the
government to coordinate securities regulation with the perceived needs of economic growth (and
occasionally to subordinate it, when economic development or long-standing business practices
clashed with investor protection). Tatsuta, supra at 101.
152. Yazawa, supra note 150, at 33. For example, the 1971 amendment was based on the 1964
amendments to the U.S. Securities Exchange Act. Under the amendment, issuers of securities listed
on an exchange or quoted over the counter are required to file semi-annual and current reports.
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and the Japanese continue to pay close attention to changes in American se-
curities regulation.
In short, the Japanese system looks very like the American system on paper.
A. Statutory Provisions
The S.E.L. contains three sections, called "articles" in Japan, which apply (or
could apply) to insider trading.
1. Short-swing profits
Article 189 is the Japanese counterpart to section 16(b) of the U.S.'s 1934 Act.
Article 189 provides for an issuer's recovery of short-swing trading profits from
its officers, directors, or more-than-10% shareholders derived from any sale and
purchase, or purchase and sale, of the issuer's equity securities within a six-
month period.'53 As in the U.S., a shareholder may bring an action in the right of
the issuer if, after demand, the issuer fails to bring its own action.
5 4
There is, however, one striking difference between the American and Japanese
legislation. In 1953, Japan repealed its version of section 16(a), which requires
insiders to report their trades. '55 While this repeal has been criticized by Japanese
commentators, 56 its result has been to nullify Article 189. Only one action has
ever been brought under that provision, and that action, which was unreported
and presumably settled, grew out of an internal management struggle.
5 7
2. Antifraud
Article 58 of the S.E.L. is a general antifraud provision which is based on Rule
lOb-5. 58 In theory, violations of Article 58 are subject to penal sanctions 59 and to
injunctive relief. 160
In fact, Article 58 has been applied only in a small number of disciplinary
cases against brokerage firms, and never for insider trading.' 6' There have been
153. Tatsuta, Proxy Regulation, Tender Offers, and Insider Trading, in JAPANESE SECURITIES
REGULATION, ch. VIII at 194. (L. Loss, M. Yazawa, and B. Banoff, ed. 1983).
154. Id.
155. Id. Tatsuta states that the provision had been easy to evade; it did not require reporting
beneficial ownership and the government did not publicize the reports. The government chose to
repeal the provision rather than correct these difficulties.
156. Tatsuta, supra note 151, at 112; id. at n. 139; lshizumi, supra note 150 at 488-89.
157. Tatsuta, supra note 153, ch. VIII, at 192; id. at n. 138. The Shokusan-Jutaku Case was brought
by new management against its former chairman to recover his short-swing profit.
158. Id.
159. id; S.E.L., supra note 147, at art. 197.1. (2).
160. Tatsuta, supra note 153, ch. VIII, at 192; S.E.L., supra note 147, at art. 187.
161. Tatsuta, supra note 153, ch. VIII, at 192; lshizumi, supra note 147, at 487.
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no prosecutions, and the Ministry of Finance has never applied for an injunction
under this (or any other) article. 16 Article 58 has "simply been inactive."' 63
Nor is the gap in enforcement likely to be remedied by private litigation. There
are no implied private rights of action under Article 58164 and, even if there were,
it is doubtful that Japanese courts would find a fiduciary duty running from
management to shareholders which would support a "disclose or abstain" rule.'65
In any event, given both the traditional Japanese reluctance to litigate and the
substantial barriers to litigation in the Japanese structure, 166 even a judiciary
inclined to substantially more activism than the Japanese would find few occa-
sions to exercise that inclination.
3. Broker-Dealer Regulation
Article 50 of the S.E.L. regulates the management and employees of "se-
curities corporations" (brokers, dealers, and underwriters) and gives the Minister
of Finance the authority to prohibit activities which prejudice the protection of
investors, are detrimental to the fairness of transactions, or undermine the cred-
itability of the securities industry. 167
Pursuant to this authority, the Minister promulgated the "Soundness Ordi-
nance",168 which regulates a wide variety of broker-dealer conduct.169 Among its
provisions, the Soundness Ordinance prohibits the management or employees of
securities corporations from engaging in securities transactions which take ad-
vantage of non-public information obtained by virtue of their position. 70
In theory, if a securities corporation or its employees violate the Ordinance, the
Minister of Finance may revoke the firm's license, suspend it from business, or
revoke or suspend the employee's license.' 7' In practice, it is quite rare for the
162. Id.
163. Tatsuta, Japan, in INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION, ch. 11,
§ 11.10 (H. Bloomenthal ed. 1987).
164. Id at 11-33.
165. It is not clear that Japanese directors have any fiduciary duties other than the duty of care.
Note, Corporate Governance in Japan: The Position of Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations,
5 U. HAW. L. REV. 135, 182 (1983). Further, judicial development is unlikely because Japanese
judges are reluctant to entertain novel policy arguments, id. at 184, and because Japan does not have a
common law system. Ishizumi, supra note 150, at 494 n. 246.
166. See infra text accompanying notes 189-91.
167. See Tatsuta, supra note 153, ch. VIII, at 193.
168. Sh~ken Gaisha no Kenzensei no Junsoku t6 ni Kansuru Sh~rei (Ministerial Ordinance on
Standard of Soundness for Securities Corporations) Ministry of Finance no. 60 of 1965, art. 1.1.(5).
169. See Tatsuta, supra note 151, at 107-08.
170. Id. See also. Tatsuta, supra note 153, ch. VIII, at 193. The ordinance creates an interesting
contrast with United Kingdom law. In the U.K. dealers and market makers are exempted from the
Insider Dealing Act if the information was obtained in the course of business and used in a perform-
ance of the business. See supra text accompany notes 123-25.
171. S.E.L., supra note 147, at arts. 35, 64.3.
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Minister to use these weapons. 72 Instead, the Government, the Stock Exchanges,
and the major securities firms have issued periodic warnings and have instituted
in-house guidelines.' 73 The academic commentators, at least, believe these
efforts to be insufficient.
7 4
4. Proposed Legislation
The Ministry of Finance has proposed new legislation which would explicitly
address insider trading.' The proposal defines inside information in terms of its
price sensitivity, including information about mergers and acquisitions, new
issues of securities, new products, and changes in balance sheet positions. Only
exchange-listed securities would be covered.
The law would apply to fiduciaries (including not only officers and directors,
but also employees of the issuer whose shares are being traded), "temporary
insiders" such as attorneys, accountants, and investment bankers, and their
tippees.
Whether or not the proposed legislation is passed, 176 it is unlikely that it will be
enforced any more rigorously than is currently the case. The proposal does not
provide for a private right of action, and does not contain specific penalties for
violation. 177 The MOF would not enforce the law itself, 178 and does not plan to
increase its staff or budget to provide additional monitoring.
B. Enforcement
As noted above, the Japanese system looks very like the American system on
paper. There are, however, major differences in practice. The statutory provisions
which might be used to prohibit or discourage insider trading are not enforced.'79
This lack of enforcement might be attributed to the fact that most Japanese do
172. Tatsuta, supra note 151, at 107. There have been eight cases of administrative sanctions, all of
them suspensions of part of the business for one to three days.
173. Id. at 112. See also Ishizumi, supra note 150, at 491; Yanase, Disclosure System, in JAPAN
SECURITIES RESEARCH INSTITUTE LECTURES ON JAPANESE SECURITIES REGULATION 65, 76-78
(1980).
174. See, e.g. Tatsuta, supra note 15 1, at 112. But see lshizumi; supra note 150, at 493-94; id at n.
247 (while law should be strengthened, administrative guidance and self-regulation may be the most
efficient and least costly system for Japan).
175. 1 Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) I (Mar. 16, 1988).
176. At least one observer doubts that it will pass. Professor Yoichi Mazuzoe said that up to one
third of the Diet engages in insider trading, which supplies about half the money used for political
campaigns. Id.
177. A Ministry of Finance official says that the penalties will probably be "much less" than those
currently available under the securities laws. Id.
178. As noted earlier, Japan does not have an independent regulatory agency such as the SEC.
Cases would be brought by the ordinary criminal prosecutors' offices, assisted by the police. Id.
179. See Tatsuta, supra note 153, ch. VIII, at 192; Tatsuta, supra note 151, at 112 (government
exhortations "mere dog howlings").
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not think there is anything wrong with insider trading, 80 but that is at best only a
partial explanation. There is almost no public or private enforcement of any of the
provisions of the securities law in Japan, whether or not they involve insider
trading.
The S.E.L. contains elaborate statutory enforcement mechanisms, largely
drawn from the American statutes, which include criminal penalties, admin-
istrative sanctions, and private rights of action. These enforcement mechanisms
are almost never used. In some cases, they have deliberatley been weakened.' 8 In
others, substantive prohibitions remain on the books but are ignored.'82 These
differences between "law on the books" and "law in action" reflect fundamental
differences in Japanese attitudes toward law, litigation, and permissible business
activities. 183
First, Japanese rarely litigate, nor do they use lawyers very often. While the
Japanese use legally-trained personnel in a wide variety of roles, 8 4 Japan has
very few lawyers engaged in the formal practice of law. In 1984, Japan had only
about 12,000 practicing attorneys; the number of lawyers per capita was roughly
one-seventeenth that of the United States.'85 In 1982, the California state courts
heard more than eleven times as many civil cases, on a per capita basis, than did
those of Japan. 86 This comparative lack of civil litigation is even more striking in
the securities area; there has only been one private action brought under any of
the S.E.L.'s provisions8 7 and the Minister of Justice has never brought an action
for injunctive relief. 88
180. See Tatsuta supra note 153, ch. VIII, at 192. Professor Tatsuta suggests elsewhere, however,
that views of the morality of inside trading may be changing, due in part to the publicity received by
American cases. Tatsuta, supra note 151, at 112.
181. See supra note 155.
182. For example, although market manipulation is officially illegal, certain manipulative practices
are considered normal ways or doing business. Kawamoto, Regulation of Exchange Markets, in
JAPANESE SECURITIES REGULATION, ch. VI, at 126-27 (L. Loss, M. Yazawa, and B. Banoff eds.
1983).
183. The Japanese are not particularly bothered by the gap between law and practice. Kenbler,
Maundheim & Shapiro, Panel Discussion on Corporate Governance U.S., German, and Japanese
Perspective, 8 J. CoMP. Bus. & CAP. MKT L. 401, 405 (1986) (the Japanese are formalists, not
legalists; cultural answer and legal answer may differ).
184. See generally Kanter, The Japan - United States Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation: Lawyers As Treaty Traders, 8 U. HAW. L. REV. 339 (1986).
185. Tanaka, The Role Of Law in Japanese Society: Comparisons with the West, 19 U. BRIT.
COLUM. L. REV. 375, 376 (1985).
186. Id. at 377. Professor Tanaka also noted that the per capita number of civil lawsuits in the
United Kingdom and West Germany was approximately ten times & twelve times that of Japan,
respectively.
187. See supra note 162. In contrast, approximately 2,292 private securities actions either origi-
nated in or were transferred into the Southern District of New York in the period from July 1, 1966 to
June 30, 1973. Banoff & DuVal, supra note 31, at 41 (1984).
188. See supra note 163.
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While the data is clear, the reasons for the comparative lack of litigation in
Japan are more controversial. One view is that the Japanese culture values har-
mony and conciliation; litigation is a threat to this cultural norm. 8 9 A variation on
the "cultural norm" explanation attributes the lack of civil litigation to a sharp
traditional division between the public and private spheres in Japan; private civil
litigation simply is not used to enforce public goals. 90
A contrasting view is that Japan's institutional barriers to litigation-no class
actions, no contingent fees, limited discovery, and a shortage of both lawyers and
judges-make litigation unprofitable. 9'
The truth may lie somewhere between the "cultural norm" and "institutional
barrier" explanations. As one noted Japanese scholar has suggested, cultures
change over time and, with the growing urbanization and industrialization of
Japan, litigation may become respectable and barriers may lower. 192
Whatever the reasons, there remains a substantial disparity between what the
statute says and what actually happens. Japan's regulation-or, more accurately,
non-regulation-of insider trading presents, in microcosm, this difference be-
tween "law on the books" and "law in practice".
Further, despite the periodic exhortations against insider trading issued by the
Government, the stock exchanges, and the academics, 93 and despite the pro-
posed legislation, 9 4 the situation is unlikely to change.
IV. CONCLUSION
I suggested at the beginning of this article that a comparative study of insider
trading was useful for two reasons. First, multi-national cooperation in enforce-
ment is easier if the countries involved have similar laws. Second, the existence
of developed securities markets in countries which do not prohibit insider trading
(or, like Japan, do not enforce a paper prohibition) provides a laboratory for
future empirical research which may support or refute some of the claims made
by its proponents and opponents.
The insider trading laws of the United States and the United Kingdom are
similar, although certainly not identical. The regulatory structure is also similar.
189. Ramseyer, The Costs of the Consensual Myth: Antitrust Enforcement and Institutional Bar-
riers to Litigation in Japan, 94 YALE L.J. 604, 607-08 (1985); Tanaka, supra note 185, at 379-80;
Note, Corporate Governance in Japan, supra note 165, at 139 n. 6.
190. Ishizumi, supra note 150, at 488-90. Ishizumi does not, however, explain the lack of public
enforcement of public goals.
191. Ramseyer, supra note 189, at 631-34. Tanaka, supra note 185, at 380-84. Ramseyer argues
that the barriers are created or maintained to enforce the nonlitigation ethos in order to benefit the
administrative bureaucracy, since the absence of litigation concentrates power in their hands.
192. Tanaka, supra note 185, at 386-88.
193. Tatsuta, supra note 153, ch. VIII, 192; id. at n. 137; Tatsuta, supra note 151 at 112.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 177-78.
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Both countries now have computerized trading records,'95 and both have an-
nounced that insider trading is an enforcement priority.' 96 The prospects for
cooperative enforcement are therefore quite good.
The framework for such cooperation already exists. The United States and the
United Kingdom have signed a Memorandum of Understanding'97 involving the
Securities Exchange Commission, the Commodities Futures Trading Commis-
sion, and the Department of Trade and Industry. An enforcement agency in one
country may submit a written request for assistance to the other, stating the
subject of the investigation, the rule violated, the grounds to suspect the subject is
involved, and why the request is reasonably relevant to the investigation. 9
Each country, of course, retains the right to refuse assistance, but they have
agreed that requests will be denied only on the basis of public interest. If a
request is denied, and the requesting agency objects, the request is to be evalu-
ated by a senior authority who will certify whether or not the request meets the
terms of the agreement. If that authority decides against the requesting agency, it
may in turn challenge that decision in writing if it has substantial grounds to do
SO.
The prospects of cooperation with Japan are more problematic. The Ministry
of Finance does issue periodic exhortations against insider trading, and as noted
earlier, is introducing new legislation to prohibit it. The Securities Bureau has
signed an agreement with the SEC to facilitate requests for surveillance and
investigatory information on a case-by-case basis,' 99 and Chairman Ruder of the
SEC recently met with several Japanese regulatory and exchange officials, where
he was assured that information would be available. 2°° A similar agreement has
been signed between the Securities Bureau and the United Kingdom's Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry,20' and Japanese delegates attended an informal con-
ference of regulatory officials from nine countries, hosted by the DTI, which
discussed establishing a network of bi-lateral agreements. 02
None of the agreements, however, requires the requested agency to comply,
and none of them relates to information that the regulatory body has not already
collected. It remains to be seen whether Japan is willing to commit the necessary
195. See supra note 77. Computerization makes it easier to conduct surveillance programs.
196. See supra, text accompanying note 62. The British government's White Paper on the Financial
Services Act emphasized vigorous enforcement. Tridimas, supra note 134 at 165. Moreover, the
provisions of the Financial Services Act that enhanced the investigative powers of the DTI were
brought into force earlier than the government had originally planned. Pennington, Insider Dealing
and the Financial Services Act, 1986, 131 SoLtc. J. 206.
197. See generally Goelzer, Sullivan, & Mills, Securities Regulation in the International Market
Place: Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements, in this volume.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 287 (Feb. 26, 1988).
201. 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 549 (Apr. 17, 1987).
202. Id. at 24 (Jan. 2, 1987).
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resources to investigate violations. Further, it is difficult to see how the Japanese
will benefit from this; since they do not enforce their own laws against insider
trading, they may not make much use of a power to request investigative as-
sistance from the United States.
If Japan's functional non-regulation of insider trading makes the prospect of
effective cooperative enforcement efforts problematic, it at least should help
researchers interested in testing some of the arguments about insider trading.
For example, it ought to be possible to determine whether investors believe
they are harmed by insider trading by comparing the prices of stocks which trade
on more than one international exchange.2 °3 Investor confidence might be meas-
ured by looking at comparative levels of investment, and the claim that corpora-
tions are harmed, either by a reduction in the flow of information internally or by
premature leakage of confidential information 2°4 might be measured by examin-
ing the comparative competitiveness of issuers in their product markets.
I suspect that such researchers will find that the level of investor confidence in
the Japanese markets is high,, that stocks do not trade at differential prices, and
that Japanese corporations are competitive. Of course, no amount of economic
analysis will persuade those who believe that insider trading just isn't fair 205-
and the members of Congress who draft securities legislation fall into that
group. 206 It is likely, therefore, that inside traders will continue to get rich in
Japan and go to jail in the United States.
203. To the extent that insider trading represents a cost to less-informed professional traders, those
traders can protect themselves by increasing the price at which they are willing to sell and reducing
the price at which they are willing to buy. Seyhun, Insiders' Profits, Costs of Trading, and Market
Efficiency, 16 J. FIN. ECON. 189 (1986). If market professionals believe that they are significantly
more at risk in trading on the Japanese exchange, the prices of stocks trading on that exchange should
reflect that risk.
204. See supra note 3.
205. See supra note 4.
206. See supra note 5.
